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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether parental alcohol consumption leads to a
reduction of child welfare. To this end, we analyse whether alcohol consumption
decreases parents’ time spent looking after children and working. Using the Russia
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, we estimate a model of intra-household allocation of
time for mono-nuclear families with children under fifteen years of age. We find that
fathers’ alcohol consumption has a negative impact on their weekly hours spent doing
child care, while no significant effect is observed for mothers’ alcohol consumption.
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Introduction
It is a widely recognized fact that alcohol consumption is a major risk factor for mor-
bidity and mortality. Higher morbidity and mortality rates, however, are not the only
negative consequences of alcohol addiction. Alcoholism is also known as a family dis-
ease, since it may lead to serious health and socio-economic problems, not only in the
short-run, but also in the long-run, through the transmission of its harmful effects to off-
spring. Parental alcoholism may negatively affect children in several ways. Many children
of alcoholics have common symptoms such as low self-esteem, loneliness, guilt, feelings
of helplessness, fears of abandonment, and chronic depression (Berger 1993; Chatterji and
Markowitz, 2001). Unfortunately, these and other more dramatic consequences, such as
domestic violence, psychological alienation, and deprivation of affection, are difficult to
be measured through general purpose socio-economic surveys.
When parents regularly consume alcohol, they may reduce time spent in child care.
Furthermore, children may also be affected through the negative effects of one parent’s
alcohol consumption on the other spouse. Family responsibilities may shift from two par-
ents to one parent and, as a result, the non-alcoholic parent may also reduce time spent
in looking after children. In all such cases, a negative impact of alcohol consumption on
child care time would imply a welfare loss for the child.
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Information on parents’ time devoted to child care and on individual alcohol consump-
tion can be fruitfully exploited to infer about the influence of alcohol consumption on
parents’ effort towards their children. Therefore, one viable way of studying the effects of
parents’ alcohol consumption on children is through parents’ time-use. This is possible
thanks to the increasing availability of more detailed data on the use of time within the
household. Using time use data, in this paper we propose a model to test the effects of
parental alcohol consumption on child care time.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to address the problem of the effects of alco-
hol consumption on the allocation of time within the household. So far, the economic
literature has focused on the effects of alcoholism on individual labour market outcomes,
based mainly on U.S. data, finding an unclear effect of alcohol abuse on labour supply. For
instance, Mullahy and Sindelar (1991) and French et al (1998) explore respectively gen-
der differences in labour force participation in response to alcoholism and alcohol abuse
on the labour supply of young men. Interestingly, Hamilton and Hamilton (1997) find
that moderate alcohol consumption leads to higher earnings relative to abstinence, while
heavy drinking leads to reduced wages relative to moderate drinking. More recently, and
again based on U.S. data, Feng et al (2001) finds that problem drinking has a negative but
non-significant impact on employment for women, and a positive and significant impact
for men, suggesting the importance of modelling the impact of alcohol consumption on
labour supply decisions separately for males and females. French et al (2011) find that
alcohol misuse is significantly related to employment problems, suggesting that the trans-
mission mechanism that links alcohol consumption and labour supply works through a
conflictive behaviour between supervisor and colleagues.
Russia is a particularly interesting setting in which to study the socio-economic conse-
quences of drinking. Alcohol consumption was the third leading cause of death during
the Soviet regime (Baltagi and Geishecker, 2006), and was one of the main causes of
increased mortality during the transition decades (Brainerd and Cutler, 2005). Tekin
(2004) has exploited the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) to esti-
mate the effects of alcohol consumption on employment and wages for males and females
during transition. His estimates reject the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped relation-
ship between alcohol consumption and employment outcomes found in Hamilton and
Hamilton (1997). Instead, the impact of alcohol consumption turns out to be non-
significant as far as labour supply is concerned, yet positive and linear for both male and
female wages levels.
Moreover, during the 90s, child care services in Russia declined as a result of economic
transition to a market economy, and their cost increased substantially, so that low income
families could not afford them anymore. As a result, after transition, Russian couples have
to rely massively on child care provided by household members (Lokshin, 2004), and,
since child care is so crucial for children’s welfare, the question as to whether child care
time provided by parents could be affected by alcohol consumption appears particularly
relevant.
Our paper uses a sample of households drawn from the RLMS-HSE to investigate
whether alcohol consumption reduces the time that parents spend with their children,
thus changing the intra-household allocation of time in an unfavourable way for children.
In line with recent advances in household economics, we analyse the time allocation deci-
sions of partners under the assumption that this is jointly determined by members of the
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household across various activities. We estimate an SUR Tobit system using Full Infor-
mation Maximum Likelihood, accounting for a possible correlation of the errors among
time-use equations, simultaneously for the husband and the wife. Our model presents
some similarities and some differences with respect to Bloemen et al (2010). It is similar
in that it treats the time use choices of both spouses jointly and analyses the same time use
categories. It is different in that it allows us to explicitly deal with the problem of sample
selection bias in labour supply and to endogenise wages in the decision process.
Our results suggest that a father’s alcohol consumption significantly reduces the time
he devotes to child care, while no effects are observed for mothers’ alcohol consumption.
Moreover, we do not find any effect of one spouse’s alcohol consumption on the other
spouse. We interpret these findings as evidence of a negative impact of fathers’ alcohol
consumption on child welfare.
The paper is structured as follows: a section on Background literature reviews the rele-
vant economic literature on allocation of time within the household and on the effects of
alcohol consumption; a section on Theoretical foundations outlines the theoretical frame-
work; a section on the Empirical strategy describes the empirical specification, while data
and variables used are presented in the section on Data. Section Results discusses the
findings of the empirical analysis, and the last section concludes.
Background literature
Spouses’ allocation of time has been treated jointly since Chiappori (1988, 1992) while
time dedicated to domestic tasks has been endogenised since Gronau (1977), Grossbard-
Shechtman (1984), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) and Apps and Rees (1996), that
extended the original time use model proposed by Becker (1965). In the recent empirical
literature, it is a common practice to separate child care time from domestic tasks1.
Studies on the determinants of parental child care have been basedmostly on systems of
simultaneous equations for paid work and child care time of individuals, as in Kalenkoski
et al (2005, 2007, 2009), mainly using the American Time Use Survey and the U.K. Time
Use Study. Kimmel and Connelly (2007) include both domestic tasks and child care. They
use data for the U.S. to estimate a four-equation system in which the dependent variables
are the minutes used in household production, leisure activities, paid work, and child
care by mothers. Their main finding is a substantial, positive wage elasticity for care time,
while both leisure and household production time decline with increased wages.
One strand of literature studies one partner’s choices conditioning on spouse’s deci-
sions, distinguishing between different activities and modelling them jointly. Powell
(2002), for example, examines the impact of child care prices and wage rates on the joint
employment and child care decisions of married mothers in Canada. She finds that wages
have a positive impact on the probability of choosing any of the working states and that
child care prices for centre, sitter, and relative care reduce the probability of working and
using each respective mode of care. Connelly and Kimmel (2009) extend the model pro-
posed by Kimmel and Connelly (2007) considering the effect of spouse’s characteristics on
time devoted to leisure, child care, and home production of married mothers and fathers.
Their results show little effect of one spouse on the unpaid time use of the partner, while
the relative wage does not affect time use choices. In Russia, Lokshin et al (2000) and
Lokshin (2004) focus again on mothers, modelling simultaneously household demand for
child care, mothers’ labour force participation and mothers’ working hours. Both studies
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do not restrict the sample to single unit households, so the inclusion ofmulti-nuclear fam-
ilies implies the need to control for not only the wage of the husband, but also the average
wage of all other family members. Their results show that mothers’ labour force partici-
pation and working hours are responsive to changes in the price of child care and hourly
wages. Additionally, (Lokshin 2004) evidences the ineffectiveness of family allowances
transfers on a household’s choice of child care arrangements.
In a growing number of studies both female and male partners’ choices regarding the
different types of activities are modelled jointly. Child care time allocation is substan-
tially different between spouses2, and, since female and male child care times are not
orthogonal, they should be modelled jointly. Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003), for exam-
ple, develop a simultaneous equation framework for child care and paid work. Using panel
data for Sweden, they find that a change in the mother’s working hours has less influence
on the parents’ time with their children than a change in the father’s working hours. Using
a similar methodology, Garcia-Mainar et al (2011) estimate a joint model of parental child
care time for five European countries. Bloemen et al (2010) analyse simultaneously the
time allocated by husband and wife to paid work, child care and housework in Italy. They
find that spouses time allocation is sensitive to personal and household characteristics,
such as education and children’s age. Menmarried to more highly educated women spend
more time with their children and the husband’s own characteristics have little effect on
wives’ time allocation.
As far as the case of Russia is concerned, during the 90s, child care institutions in Russia,
as well as female labour force participation, declined as a result of the economic transition
from a socialist to a market economy. At the same time, the cost of child care supplied by
the government increased, making daycare services unaffordable for low income families
with young children. Lokshin et al (2000) and (Lokshin 2004) use the 1994 - 1996 rounds
of RLMS to estimate a model of consumer demand for state provided child care and find
that mothers’ decisions to send children to formal child care and to participate in the
labour market are taken jointly. They find that the cost of private child care is a disincen-
tive to participation, while public transfers in the form of family allowances are ineffective.
Similarly, Grogan and Koka (2010) estimate a discrete choice model of mothers’ labour
force participation for a longer panel and find an even stronger negative effect for having
children under 3 in the 2000s. As a result, during the 90s, in-home care increased to lev-
els ranging from 69.4% to 99.9% of total child care time, depending on child age. These
findings suggest that Russian couples, after the economic transition, have to rely almost
completely on informal child care provided within the household.
As for alcohol consumption, it is well known that in Russia alcohol consumption is
high, with effects on health that increase morbidity and mortality. Brainerd and Cutler
(2005) suggest that the increase in alcohol consumption is one of the leading causes of the
dramatic positive trend in mortality rates during transitional years, accounting for about
25% of the increased mortality3. Moreover, consumption of vodka is more likely to be
binge rather than moderate drinking (Brainerd and Cutler, 2005; Baltagi and Geishecker,
2006). During the transition to a market economy, positive trends in alcohol consump-
tion patterns were observed by several studies, all of them using RLMS data. Zohoori et al
(1998) and Brainerd and Cutler (2005) found that in the early 1990s, per-capita consump-
tion of alcohol doubled in particular among middle-aged men. In the following years, this
upward trend was interrupted by an increase in the price of alcohol, until 1998 when it
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started to rise again (RLMS data suggest an increase of 27% in alcohol consumption in
the whole period 1992-2000). The last five waves of RLMS (2006-2010) partially confirm
the previous trends, with total daily alcohol intake for drinkers showing a slight increase
for males and an essentially stable path for females.
Theoretical foundations
A bulk of literature, starting with Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) for marriage market
models and Apps and Rees (1996) within the collective framework, have formulated util-
ity models that account for both the multi-person nature of many households and the
inclusion of household production. In these models, time allocation decisions of male
and female partners are jointly determined, as well as the allocation of time among the
different types of activities.
The model proposed here is grounded in this stream of literature and presents three
main features: i) child care time is included as a separate time use category as in Kimmel
and Connelly (2007) and Connelly and Kimmel (2009), ii) husbands’ and wives’ time use
are jointly determined as in Bloemen et al (2010), and iii) information on individual alco-
hol consumption is exploited to test its impact on individual allocation of time and on
intra-household distribution of domestic tasks and paid work.
In theory, as was postulated by Becker (1981), parents are assumed to have altruistic
preferences towards the other family members. This assumption implies the inclusion
of partner’s and child’s welfare among the arguments of each parent’s utility function. In
particular, parents have the following altruistic utility functions:
Um = Um(tlm, zam,Uf ,Uc)
Uf = Uf (tlf , zaf ,Um,Uc)
Uc = Uc(zc) (1)
where m and f represent male and female partners, tl is leisure time, za is a composite
consumption good consumed by each adult (such that zam + zaf = za), produced as a
combination of household production time of the two partners and of intermediate goods
and services purchased in the market za = g(tdm, tdf , x). zc is a composite good consumed
by the children and produced as a combination of child care time of the two partners and
goods and services purchased in the market zc = g(tcm, tcf , x). It follows that each parent’s
utility can, without loss of generality, be rewritten as:
Ui = Ui(tlm, tlf , zam, zaf , zc). (2)
Assuming that the adults take responsibility for maximizing family welfare, they maxi-
mize household utility subject to the constraints of both their own time as well as that of
the household budget:
Tm = twm + tdm + tcm + tlm
Tf = twf + tdf + tcf + tlf
p′x = wf twf + wmtwm + v (3)
where w, d, c and l are time use categories (paid work, domestic tasks, child care and
leisure time respectively), v is household non-labour income, and p′x is household expen-
diture on market goods. It is worth noting that such a specification is general and
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embraces both unitary and collective decision models depending on how household util-
ity is specified. The solution of the model yields the supply functions of the uses of time
for both partners:
tki = tki (wi,wj, v) (4)
where, for each individual (i = m, f ) each time use category (k = c, d,w, l) depends on
wages (wi and wj), household non-labour income (v) and the structure of preferences4.
Family and personal characteristics, indeed, can be included in the time use functions as
preference factors.
The system defined by the paid work, domestic tasks and child care equations for
each partner (leisure equations are excluded to avoid collinearity), as previously stated,
is potentially compatible with a collective specification (see, for example, Bourguignon,
1999; Mangiavacchi et al, 2010; Dunbar et al, 2013). However, as the data includes no
child exclusive goods (for parents we could use the respective leisure times), it would be
impossible to identify the child sharing rule. Thus, the use of a collective model would
imply an unnecessary burden, at least for the aims of this paper.
As detailed in the next section, our empirical strategy is to estimate the reduced form
equation system (4). Even though this strategy does not allow us to fully recover the struc-
tural parameters of preferences, it still allows us to determine the impact of an exogenous
variable on the time use equations. In our context, child care time directly affects child
consumption, and, by consequence, what affects child care time, also affects child wel-
fare. The child’s utility depends on the amount of good zc that the child consumes, which,
in turn, have child care time among its production input factors. By assumption, in fact,
the time devoted to child care has a strictly positive productivity: a larger amount of time
input increases zc. In turn, zc has a strictly positive marginal utility for the child. This
implies that an exogenous variable that significantly reduces child care time, also signifi-
cantly reduces zc. However, since zc also depends on purchased goods x, a parent might
renounce to some child care time in favour of paid work time, thus increasing child utility
by increasing expenditure on x. However, if an exogenous variable negatively affects child
care time and has no positive impacts on market labour time of both partner, then there
would be an unquestionable negative impact on child welfare. We apply this line of rea-
soning to understand the transmission mechanism of the effects of alcohol consumption
on child welfare.
Empirical strategy
The empirical specification of the system of equations (4) involves considering several
factors to avoid biased estimates. Each time use equation is left censored, since, for some
individuals, the minimum amount of child care, domestic tasks or paid work is zero. A
suitable econometric model in this case would be a type-1 Tobit (Amemiya, 1985). This
specification, however, may be problematic. In fact, non-workers’ potential wages must
be estimated, and the empirical literature widely recognizes the possibility of a sample
selection bias. One solution is to estimate wages independently for men and women in a
first stage using a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). Moreover, estimating the
wage equations using a Heckman selection model implies estimating a labour participa-
tion equation. So, labour supply equations in (4) could also be estimated more precisely if
estimated jointly with this labour participation equation. This is possible using a system
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in which one participation equation is used by two different equations, namely the wage
and labour supply equations. Finally, our theoretical model requires the reduced form
equations to be estimated jointly, allowing for possible correlation among the error terms.
In fact, since our unit of observation is the family, we have to take into account that the
amount of time devoted to one activity by one individual not only depends on time spent
in other activities, but also on time spent in this and other activities by his/her partner.
For example, the mother’s child care time will depend on her paid work status (being on
leave, working part time or full time, and so on), but also on her husband’s paid work: if
he works more hours, she might carry out more child care, and vice-versa.
In sum, our empirical specification is a SUR consisting of four equations for the part-
ners’ child care and domestic tasks (specified as type-1 Tobit, since almost all individuals
participate in these activities, so that the number of censored observations is reasonably
small), and six equations for the partners’ labour participation, labour supply and wages
(specified as a type-5 Tobit). Each partner has five equations two of which are for child
care and for domestic tasks and are specified as:
tk∗i = β0 + βaiai + βajaj + βwiwi + βwjwj + βvv + β ′PiPi + β ′FiF + ui,k
tki = tk∗i if tk∗i > 0
tki = 0, otherwise, (5)
with i, j = f ,m indicating the partner, either female (f ) or male (m), k = d, c representing
domestic tasks (d) or child care (c), ai,j being individual alcohol consumption, and Pi and
F personal and family characteristics5. The other three equations are for labour market
participation, labour supply and wage, and are specified as:
d∗i = β ′XiXi + ei
w∗i = β ′ZiZi + vi
tw∗i = β0 + βaiai + βajaj + βwiwi + βwjwj + βvv + β ′PiPi + β ′FiF + ui,w
di = 1 if d∗i > 0
di = 0 otherwise
twi = tw∗i if d∗i > 0
twi = 0, otherwise
wi = w∗i if d∗i > 0
wi = 0, otherwise, (6)
with the dummy d∗i indicating the participation equation, w∗i the wage equation and tw∗i
the labour supply equation for member i.
The exogenous variables, presented in the next section, include economic variables,
such as partners’ potential wages and non-labour income, and other individual and
household characteristics, including our relevant variable of interest, namely, alcohol
consumption by each partner.
It is worth stressing that, in our model, parents’ attitude towards alcohol might be
endogenous. One weakness of our analysis is that we were not able to find a suitable
instrument to apply an instrumental variable estimation technique6.
The whole system is composed by 10 equations: 6 for the use of time (paid work, twi ,
domestic tasks, tdi and child care, tci , for i = m, f ), 2 labour market participation equations
2013, 2:13
http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/13
Giannelli et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 8 of 23
and 2 wage equations. The resulting error structure is slightly more complex than a stan-
dard SUR. The error terms are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero
mean and a 10×10 covariance matrix, correlation between the error terms is allowed
between time-use equations and own-wage equations, but participation equations are
allowed to be correlated only with their own labour supply and wage equation. So, for
the avoidance of doubt, correlation is not allowed between female labour market partici-
pation and male wage, or between male labour market participation and male child care
time. Correlation is allowed for all other equations, so, for instance, the error term in the
female wage equation may be correlated with the error term in the female domestic tasks
equation.
The covariance matrix, thus, takes the following form
where σ 2i indicates the variance of error term i, σiσiρi,j indicates the covariance
between two error terms i and j, and ρi,j indicates the correlation coefficients, with
i, j = 1, . . . , 10 ≡ um,c, uf ,c, um,d, uf ,d, um,w, uf ,w, em, ef , vm, vf .
The system is estimated by Full Information Maximum Likelihood using the aML
statistical software7.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on four rounds (XV to XVIII, spanning from 2006 to 2009)
of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE), conducted by the Higher
School of Economics and ZAO Demoscop together with the Carolina Population Center,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS8. The sur-
vey has two phases: during the first phase of the project (1992 -1994), the RLMS collected
four rounds of data; in the second phase, until 2011, the RLMS collected sixteen further
rounds of data. Households participating in the survey were selected trough a multi-stage
probability sampling procedure in order to guarantee national representativeness. Within
each selected primary sample unit, the population was stratified into urban and rural
substrata in order to guarantee representativeness of the sample in both areas. Between
rounds XV and XVIII, the data covers approximately 5,000 households, 12,000 adults and
2,000 children per wave.
Since the RLMS was originally designed to monitor the health impact of economic
transition in Russia, it contains detailed information on alcohol consumption of the
respondents, use of time and labour supply. The RLMS permits the identification of the
relationship between each member in the household, not only with respect to the head of
the household. This allows us to select only households with no more than one nuclear
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family, avoiding problems due to the presence of more than one family with children
in the same household9. This could amount to a serious issue, since, as was found by
Lokshin et al (2000) and Lokshin (2004), the share of extended families in Russia increased
substantially during the transition period, and more than half of Russian children live
in extended families. The availability of the relationship between all household mem-
bers also permits the identification of the number of potential suppliers of non-parental
informal child care in the family, such as grandparents. Therefore, even if multifamily
households are excluded from the analysis, we have kept in the sample households with
co-resident grandparents.
Individual alcohol consumption is recorded by the RLMS for all rounds of Phase II.
However, only from round XV it is possible to identify the actual monthly consumption.
The dataset is also rich in time-use information, even if time spent in domestic activi-
ties and informal care is recorded only from rounds XV to XVIII10. In these four rounds,
time use is recorded within the labour module of the survey, where people declared min-
utes spent per day in different activities in the last 30 days both during working days and
weekends.
It is worth noting that, due to the sampling design, it was not possible to construct a
household panel data-set, because families are not uniquely identified over time. While it
is rather easy to track individuals, a unique family identifier cannot be constructed. For
example, consider two subsequent waves in which a household splits because a son gets
married. It is not possible to follow this family over time because: i) the two new families
maintain the old household identification number that refers to the previous wave, but for
the current wave one keeps the same identification number and the other gets a new one,
ii) cross sectional identification numbers may be different in the way they are constructed
(in round XV the family identifier received one more digit, and a change in the sample
design in round XVIII implied that identification numbers are constructed using differ-
ent stratification variables). The combination of these two conditions together with the
explicit recommendation of HSE to not reconstruct a certain wave identification number
using a different wave stratification data, prevented us from building a household panel
data-set11.
So, despite the advantages of a panel data-set, we were forced to pool the four waves
into a cross section. In particular, we took all families present in round XVIII and added
families from the previous waves that were not present in that round12.
The dependent variables included in the system of equations are the logarithms of
weekly hours spent respectively in child care13, domestic tasks14 and paid work. Even
though time-use patterns may differ between weekdays and weekends, weekly amounts
are used since alcohol consumption is not recorded separately for weekends and week-
days. Regarding time-use categories, as previously mentioned, to identify the effect of
parental alcohol consumption on child welfare we separate child care from domestic
tasks, as in Kimmel and Connelly (2007), Connelly and Kimmel (2009) and Bloemen
et al (2010). Average weekly child care hours are 9.7 hours for men and 15.3 hours
for women. Domestic tasks time is 12.9 hours for men and 22.8 hours for women,
and paid work time on average is 42.1 hours for men and 31.4 hours for women
(see Table 1).
Table 2 shows the joint distribution of time use categories and alcohol consumption
for the sample under analysis15. It can be seen that fathers rarely carry out more child
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Table 1 Overall scores across all the thirty-nine participants under each condition
Husband Wife
Individual variables Mean SD Mean SD
Weekly childcare hours 9.6805 10.6318 15.3346 13.1642
Weekly domestic work hours 12.9085 12.4256 22.8007 12.8250
Weekly market work hours 42.0895 20.3362 31.3644 20.1227
Grams of alcohol per day / BMI 0.5379 0.9884 0.1314 0.4132
Ln of wage rate 4.2715 0.7401 3.9438 0.6884
Age 35.3745 7.4685 32.8741 7.1889
Non-Russian 0.2727 - 0.2448 -
Pension (not retired) 0.0505 - 0.0249 -
Primary education 0.2821 - 0.4367 -
Tertiary education 0.3963 - 0.2580 -
Occasional drinker 0.7172 - 0.5975 -
Frequent drinker 0.0583 - 0.0054 -
Pregnant - - 0.0163 -
Self-reported health status (cat.) 2.5144 0.5964 2.6169 0.5995
Disability + Chronic illness 0.3326 0.5063 0.3691 0.5063
Number of cigarettes 11.3108 10.2433 2.2688 5.0365
Household variables Mean SD
Number of children [0–1] 0.0785 0.2719
Number of children [4–6] 0.6263 0.6206
Number of children [0–3] 0.3737 0.5329
Presence of a nursery in the community 0.5975 0.4906
Community males/females ratio 0.9987 0.0572
Community male/female wage ratio 1.2138 0.1224
Community average wage 50.0878 13.3053
Receive help with childcare (cat.) 0.4476 0.5904
Ln of non labour income 6.0025 3.5253
Dwelling dimension (cat.) 1.9751 0.7072
Number of grandparents 0.0505 0.2426
Number of uncles 0.0186 0.1709
Dwelling dimension (cat.) 1.9829 0.7096
Owner of dwelling 0.6807 -
Female headed household 0.0016 -
Region 1 - Metropolitan area 0.0948 -
Region 2 - Northern area 0.0824 -
Region 3 - Central area 0.1748 -
Region 4 - Volga 0.1810 -
Region 5 - Caucas 0.1298 -
Region 6 - Ural 0.1399 -
Region 7 - West Siberia 0.0925 -
Region 8 - East Siberia 0.1049 -
Round XV 0.0824 -
Round XVI 0.1033 -
Round XVII 0.0948 -
Round XVIII 0.7195 -
1287 observations.
care than mothers, but still almost 60% of them dedicate at least 5 hours weekly to child
care. This figure rises to 75.4% for mothers. The domestic tasks rely even more heavily












Table 2 Joint distribution of child care, domestic tasks, paid work and alcohol consumption
Wives Domestic Wives
Childcare 0 (0–5] (5–20] >20 Total tasks 0 (0–10] (10–30] >30 Total
0 10.3 2.6 6.1 2.4 21.4 0 0.5 1.6 5.8 2.3 10.3
Husbands (0–5] 1.0 4.4 11.7 2.6 19.7 Husbands (0–10] 0.0 7.4 25.6 8.3 41.3
(5–20] 2.3 3.0 24.9 15.3 45.5 (10–30] 0.2 5.3 22.6 11.7 39.7
>20 0.5 0.5 4.7 7.5 13.4 >30 0.0 0.5 4.7 3.5 8.8
Total 14.1 10.5 47.5 27.9 100 Total 0.6 14.8 58.7 25.8 100
Wives Alcohol Wives
Paid work 0 (0–32] (32–45] >45 Total consumption 0 (0–2] (2–10] >10 Total
0 4.4 1.5 4.2 2.4 12.5 0 14.8 4.0 3.3 0.6 22.7
Husbands (0–32] 0.3 0.5 1.6 0.2 2.6 Husbands (0–2] 3.3 2.6 0.8 0.1 6.8
(32–45] 8.3 4.6 26.4 7.6 46.9 (2–10] 12.6 10.8 9.2 0.9 33.5
>45 10.6 3.7 15.9 7.9 38.0 >10 8.9 8.0 14.8 5.3 37.0
Total 23.6 10.2 48.2 18.0 100 Total 39.7 25.4 28.0 6.9 100
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while almost 85% of wives do more than 10 hours. The situation changes respect to paid
work, where only 15% of fathers are unemployed or part-time workers, with an impressive
38% of overtime workers. Women, however, do show large percentages of full-time and
overtime work: 48% and 18% respectively.
As to the drinker’s profile, drinking is mostly a male phenomenon (see Baltagi and
Geishecker, 2006). Table 1 shows that in our sample more than 77% of men reported
drinking, either occasionally (71.7%) or frequently - drinking every day or almost every
day - (5.8%). For women, these figures are 59.8% and 0.5%, respectively. A substantial dif-
ference is also present in the level of consumption. As shown by Figure 1, male drinkers
drink at least twice as much as women. Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) also show that male
drinkers are likely to bemarried, to have children, to be well educated and to have a higher
household income than non-drinkers.
In the RLMS, individual alcohol consumption is self-reported by the respondent in the
health module. In Russia, alcohol consumption is measured in grams instead of litres,
so each respondent is asked to declare how many grams of beer, wine, fortified wine,
home-made liquor, vodka, and other alcoholic beverages they usually drink per day dur-
ing the last 30 days. However, only from round XV it is possible to identify the actual
monthly consumption, since respondents have also to declare the days per month they
have been drinking. Following Baltagi and Geishecker (2006), these amounts are adjusted
for pure alcohol content in order to make the various types of alcoholic beverages compa-
rable and then summed up to compute total individual alcohol consumption. The weights
used are 5% for the alcohol content of beer, 10% for wine, 19% for fortified wine, 45% for
home made liquor, 40% for vodka, and 20% for other alcohol. Finally, the alcohol variables
included in the equations are computed as the logarithm of grams of total alcohol intake
per week, and divided by the body mass index of the person, in order to control for the
possibly different impact of similar amounts of alcohol on different sized individuals. As
to the possible doubts on the validity of self-reported measures of alcohol consumption,
we follow the idea, again found in Baltagi and Geishecker (2006), that self-declared alco-
hol consumption in Russia should not be under-reported, since there is no social stigma
Husbands
Wives
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
125.4 121.5 133.9 128.3 131.2
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attached to alcohol consumption within the country. Recall errors are still possible, but at
least there should not be a clear negative bias in the declared quantities.
The figures presented in Table 2 confirm that alcohol in Russia is mainly a male phe-
nomenon. More than 70% of fathers drink more than 2 grams of pure alcohol per day
(on average) and 37% more than 10 grams (that corresponds to 25 grams - a small glass -
of vodka). 10% of males drink more than 30 grams of alcohol per day (not shown in the
table). Women drink much less, most of them (65%) consuming less than 2 grams of
alcohol per day, which amounts approximately to one glass of vodka per week. Only a
few consume more than one glass of vodka per day (less than 7%) and almost 40% are
abstemious (compared with 23% of males).
Although the focus of this paper is on the effects of alcohol on child welfare, wages
are a critical variable that needs special attention in the analysis. As already discussed,
previous analyses on the relation between alcohol and wages suggest a positive correlation
(see Tekin, 2004). Thus a wage equation for each of the spouses is included in the system,
and to correct possible self-selection bias, correlation between the error terms of the wage
equation and the equation for labour participation is allowed.
Other explanatory variables included in the model (see Table 1) are the number of chil-
dren in the age ranges of 0–1, 0–3 and 4–6, the number of grandparents and uncles living
in the household, a dummy for being an entrepreneur, the health status (a categorical
indicator equal to one in presence of chronic illness or disability and 2 if both of them
are present, and a dummy indicating if receiving some pension, excluding retirement
pension), whether the household receives help with child care by relatives not living in the
household, the number of cigarettes per day and a standard list of individual demographic
controls (age, education, nationality). We also control for the economic condition of the
household, using non-labour income, dwelling ownership, and dwelling size. Finally, some
regional variables are included, namely, average males/females ratio, male/female wage
ratio, average wage, regional dummies and a dummy indicating the presence of a nursery
in the community.
The sample selection starts by keeping mothers and fathers in the age 17–65 with
children younger than 15 for the four waves and excludingmulti-nuclear families (approx-
imately 4400 households). Repeated households are then dropped by the sample (about
3100). Eliminating inconsistent observations, for example those with zero salary and a
positive amount of worked hours, leads to the final sample, which is composed of 1287
households.
Given the complexity of the empirical specification, it is worth specifying the exclusions
restrictions that help identifying the model16. First, the participation equation includes
variables that are excluded both from the labour supply and the wage equations. In
addition, the wage equation should include some variables not present in the labour
supply equation. Thus, we have three sets of exclusion restrictions. The first set con-
cerns the participation equation with the labour supply equation where the excluded
variables are: being an occasional drinker, being pregnant (wives only), the number
of children in the age range 0–1, dwelling ownership, and three dummies identify-
ing the waves of the panel. The second set of restrictions concerns the participation
with the wage equation, where the excluded variables are: average males/females ratio,
receive help with child care, number of grandparents, being pregnant, number of chil-
dren aged 0–3, being non-Russian and being in bad health conditions. Finally, the
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third set of restrictions concerns the wage equation with the labour supply equation,
and the excluded variables are: being an occasional drinker, having only primary
education, number of children aged 0–1, dwelling ownership, and the three waves
dummies.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated parameters of the empirical model introduced in
Section “Theoretical foundations”. As to the joint nature of the decision processes, the
significance of cross equation correlations and of most of the reciprocal variables suggest
that the choice of the joint estimation approach is appropriate.
As to the main focus of this paper, our results suggest that the amount of consumed
alcohol is a relevant factor in determining fathers’ child care time, influencing negatively
and significantly (at 5%) their weekly hours spent in this activity. Manually computing the
average partial effect17 of one additional gram of pure alcohol per day for the averagemale
drinker -who drinks 9.7 grams of pure alcohol per day and has a BMI of 25.9- implies a
reduction of 2.5 minutes of child care time per week. In our opinion this is a rather large
effect. Indeed, drinking one more grass of vodka per day, which contains about 10 grams
of pure alcohol, reduces fathers’ child care time by almost half an hour. Along this line,
drinking 5 glasses more would imply a reduction of more than two hours with respect to
an average of 9.7 hours.
According to our theoretical specification, this effect can be interpreted as a negative
effect of the father’s alcohol consumption on child welfare. Alcohol reduces the time
fathers devote to children, thus reducing the amount of child composite good zc produced
and, therefore, children’s utility. Mothers’ alcohol consumption, instead, has no signifi-
cant effect on child care. Also, for both parents, it has no significant effect on household
income, either through hours of work or in regards to wages, so that we do not observe
a compensation for the welfare loss through an increase in market goods expenditure, x.
This result is in line with Tekin (2004), who finds that alcohol consumption has no
significant effect on employment and wages for either males or females.
We find, however, a positive effect of moderate drinking on paid work that is probably
linked to the social aggregation value that occasional drinking may generate, especially in
a country like Russia, where drinking is not associated with social stigma. This is observed
through a positive and significant effect of being an occasional drinker on labour par-
ticipation for husbands and wives. Moreover, being an occasional drinker has a positive
effect on wives’ wages. Again, this is in line with previous findings of a positive associa-
tion between moderate drinking and earnings (Berger and Leigh,1988; Zarkin et al, 1998;
MacDonald and Shields, 2001).
In the absence of other studies on the effects of alcohol consumption on the couples’
use of time, a comparison can be done with a recent study on the effects of alcohol con-
sumption on the intra-household distribution of resources in Italy (Menon et al, 2012).
The authors find that husbands’ alcohol consumption significantly reduces wives’ shares
of economic resources (while the reverse is not true), thus significantly affecting wives’
well-being.
The presence of a nursery in the community positively influences participation to the
labour market for both parents, and significantly increases the hours of paid work by the












Table 3 SUR Tobit estimation
Childcare Domestic tasks Paid work Labour participation Wage
Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife
Constant -2.4704 -1.3490 2.6235 0.8920 3.3917*** 4.1657*** 0.4759 -4.8002*** 3.0383*** 1.8864
(2.2833) (2.1725) (1.9897) (1.0965) (.63356) (.83443) (1.9652) (1.6746) (.74643) (1.2547)
Alcohol -0.0973** -0.0079 0.0011 0.0717 0.0168 0.0005 0.0378 0.0315
(.04751) (.15193) (.04072) (.08889) (.01363) (.03917) (.03354) (.25665)
Alcohol-partner -0.0612 -0.0649 0.1009 -0.0182 -0.0102 0.0055
(.17791) (.04909) (.16485) (.02012) (.02972) (.01292)
Occasional drinker 0.2875*** 0.2602*** 0.0213 0.2328***
(.10298) (.09161) (.05861) (.08779)
Presence of nursery 0.2220** 0.1101 0.1015 -0.0060 0.0059 0.0530* 0.2354** 0.3068*** 0.2318*** 0.1172
(.09292) (.09385) (.08241) (.04067) (.02411) (.03018) (0.1067) (.09302) (.05938) (.10549)
Males/female ratio -0.5220 0.1580 -1.8410 -0.2930 1.2559** 0.0845 0.6353 0.4532
(1.7697) (1.6817) (1.6965) (.71607) (.54703) (.59898) (1.4627) ( 1.487)
Male/female wage ratio 2.5636*** 1.6303* -0.0695 0.6723 0.0417 -0.1316
(.85723) (.84098) (0.7761) (0.4211) (.19615) (.26162)
Average wage 0.0226 0.0104 0.0061 0.0154* -0.0139** -0.0056 -0.0025 -0.0145
(.02217) (.02155) (.02025) (.00848) (.00606) (.00652) (.01056) (.01715)
Help with childcare 0.1065 0.1359* -0.0176 -0.0340 -0.0045 0.0138 0.1179 0.0996
(.08128) (.08081) (.06574) (0.0267) (.01713) (.02067) (.08511) (.08261)
Number of grandparents 0.3474* 0.1051 -0.2256* -0.2156*** -0.0689 0.0387 -0.2152 -0.1534
(.20054) (.21086) (.12052) (.06058) (.05016) (.05845) (.19973) (.19119)
Age -0.2966 0.0860 0.0073 0.0908 0.0090 -0.1501 0.2021 2.6074*** 0.4643 1.2394**
(.45831) (0.3836) (.40631) (.19774) (.10083) (.18565) (0.5941) (.46815) (.31869) (.61251)
Age squared 0.0200 -0.0399 0.0106 -0.0118 -0.0001 0.0167 -0.0424 -0.3543*** -0.0636 -0.1529
(.05946) (0.0524) (.05426) (.02855) (.01351) (.02597) (.07642) (.06497) (.04227) (.09475)
Age ratio 0.1530 0.0601 0.0248 0.2205* -0.0054 0.1011
(.28802) (0.2829) (.24641) (.11664) (.07074) (.08344)
Wage rate 0.1653*** 0.0629** 0.0820*** -0.0077 -0.0401 -0.0021
(.02927) (.02763) (.02797) (.01196) (.05082) (.00839)
Wage rate - partner 0.0531** 0.1408*** 0.1277*** 0.1560*** -0.0164*** 0.0274
















Table 3 SUR Tobit estimation (Continued)
Non-labour income -0.0091 0.0072 0.0186* 0.0027 -0.0046 -0.0043
(.01243) (.01183) (.01071) (.00528) (.00285) (.00359)
Primary education -0.1410** -0.1645
(.06987) (.11351)
Tertiary education 0.0777 0.1695* 0.1546* 0.0124 -0.0114 -0.0319 0.0078 0.0104
(.10471) (0.0935) (.09346) (.04059) (.02297) (.02807) (.08135) (.10996)
Tertiary education - partner 0.0908 -0.0371 -0.0512 0.0469 0.0202 0.0350
(.09498) (.09415) (.07986) (.04188) (.02077) (.02915)
Pregnant 0.9923**
(.43138)
Number of children [0–1] 0.1190 0.3339* -0.1292 -0.3364**
(.23312) (.17092) (.09264) (.13405)
Number of children [0–3] 0.7903*** 0.4580*** 0.2182** -0.1899*** -0.0048 -0.0241 -0.1412 -0.5732***
(.11242) (.08873) (.09068) (0.0412) (.02293) (.03386) (.14257) (.12271)
Number of children [4–6] 0.5140*** 0.4016*** 0.0611 0.0754* 0.0191 0.0266 0.1072 0.1366 0.0053 -0.2427***
(.10317) (.09974) (.08489) (.04281) (.02234) (.03155) (.11866) (.09601) (.05592) (.08659)
Non-Russian -0.1540* -0.3392*** -0.0776 0.0309 0.0184 0.0167 -0.1382 -0.3769***
(.09169) (.08075) (.08378) (.03984) (.02526) (0.0299) (.15053) (.12322)
Bad health 0.1299 -0.3613 -0.1640 -0.0622 -0.0561 -0.1589 -0.1622** 0.1131
(.35899) (.42834) (.29125) (.26532) (.13324) (.39767) (.07518) (.07532)
N. of cigarettes 0.0004 0.0097 -0.0067* 0.0010 0.0020* 0.0028 0.0017 -0.0277*** -0.0097*** 0.0148
(.00367) (.00701) (.00348) (.00362) (.00104) (.00244) (.00517) (.00823) (.00254) (0.0104)
Pension (not retired) 0.2441 0.4322 -0.2520 0.1800 -0.0108 -0.0473
(.23874) (.33354) (.18329) (.24143) (.06597) (.17239)
Dimension of dwelling -0.2221*** -0.0717 0.0528 0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0118
(.05602) (.05409) (.05795) (.02301) (0.0143) (.01867)
Owner of dwelling -0.1531 0.0549 0.0408 -0.0004
(.11509) (.09406) (.05923) (.08528)
Region 1 (Metropolitan area) -0.2783 0.0206 -0.1243 -0.4387 0.5077** 0.0761 0.7092*** -0.0894 0.7735** 0.7359
(.79398) (.77319) (.72494) (.30198) (.22991) (.24192) (.24644) (.14753) (.35939) (.59509)
Region 2 (Northern area) -0.7659 -0.0966 -0.0949 -0.3970 0.4676** 0.1597 0.2667 0.4829** 0.5052* 0.6558
















Table 3 SUR Tobit estimation (Continued)
Region 3 (Central area) 0.8178*** 0.3788 0.1882 0.2344** -0.0859 -0.0764 0.1561 0.0710 0.0470 -0.0664
(.25745) (.24344) (.24919) (.10998) (0.0602) (.07563) (0.2337) (.22816) (.08147) (.11721)
Region 4 (Volga) 0.5802* 0.4764 0.0215 0.3732*** -0.1434* -0.0675 0.2689* 0.1229 -0.1828 -0.2506
(.30451) (0.2932) (.27678) (.12313) (.07561) (.08869) (.14719) (.12529) (.12893) (0.1958)
Round 2 0.1999 0.2315 0.1192 0.0312
(.24159) (.20336) (.12315) (.25126)
Round 3 -0.0783 0.1053 0.5002*** 0.2038
(.26127) (.20395) (0.1282) (.24058)
Round 4 -0.1593 0.0481 0.4897*** 0.1240
(.21641) (.16216) (.10348) (.20468)
















Table 4 Errors variance/covariancematrix for the SUR Tobit estimation
Variance/covariance matrix
Childcare Domestic tasks Paid work Labour participation Wage
Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife
Child care - husband 1.2624*** 0.4741*** 0.2334*** 0.1192*** -0.0389 -0.0277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0727** 0.0000
(.04129) (.02274) (.02865) (0.0294) (0.0416) (0.0359) (-) (-) (.03403) (-)
Child care - wife 1.1733*** 0.1038*** 0.2084*** 0.0416 -0.0895** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0280
(.03532) (.03131) (.03001) (.04315) (.04442) (-) (-) (-) (.04654)
Domestic tasks - husband 1.0834*** 0.1307*** -0.0202 0.0623 0.0000 0.0000 0.1533*** 0.0000
(.02657) (.03288) (.04223) (.04157) (-) (-) (.03572) (-)
Domestic tasks - wife 0.4984*** 0.0544 -0.1085* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1771***
(.00902) (.04014) (.05668) (-) (-) (-) (.04442)
Paid work - husband 0.2524*** 0.0264 -0.3262*** 0.0000 -0.1210 0.0000
(.00585) (.04478) (0.1031) (-) (0.1468) (-)
Paid work - wife 0.2939*** 0.0000 0.8627*** 0.0000 -0.2366
(0.0132) (-) (0.2845) (-) (.17484)
Labour participation - husband 1.0000 0.0000 0.0921 0.0000
(-) (-) (.08512) (-)
Labour participation - wife 1.0000 0.0000 -0.8781***
(-) (-) (.08751)
Wage - husband 0.7466*** 0.1819***
(.01251) (.03883)
Wage - wife 1.0645***
(.02265)
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counter-intuitive: an increase in husbands’ hours of child care. The most likely mecha-
nism that explains this result is that indeed the nursery offers a useful service that allows
mothers to work more, but given the rigidities in the labour market contracts - such as the
scarce implementation of flexible time contracts - and the inability of nurseries to fully
cover the weekly hours of work, husbands may need to compensate with more hours of
child care.
As to the other individual variables included in the model, at variance with Kimmel
and Connelly (2007), age has no effect on child care and domestic tasks, while it has a
positive (quadratic) impact on wives’ labour participation (the greatest impact is at around
35 years). The husband/wife age ratio is significant and positive in determining wives’
domestic tasks, meaning that wives with a much older husband tend to do more domestic
tasks. This is to be expected, since this situation may be a proxy of a very traditional
household type.
The individual’s and partner’s wage rate is positively and significantly associated with
more child care for both spouses. This seems to suggest that child care has a positive value
per-se and the time spent with children increases with the family’s social position (in terms
of paid work status). Wages also significantly affect domestic tasks, and in particular the
partner’s wage rate increases the hours of domestic tasks - a result similar to Bloemen
et al (2010). If the estimated model was a collective specification this would have been a
sign of the increased bargaining power of the partner when he/she has a larger wage rate.
Finally, the wage rate of the wife reduces husband’s hours of paid work, while the opposite
effect is not observed.
Women with higher education carry out more child care: they may be more conscious
that the time parents spend with their children is a strong contribution to a child’s devel-
opment. Husbands’ education level, on the other hand, is positively related to time spent
in domestic tasks. This may be sign of more modern, non-patriarchal households types.
Having no more than a primary education tends to reduce husbands’ wage rate. For
Italian couples, Bloemen et al (2010) find negative signs for the coefficients of primary
school education, both in the husband’s and wife’s child care equations. On the other
hand, for American mothers Kimmel and Connelly (2007) and Connelly and Kimmel
(2009) find a negative impact of education on child care time. This discrepancy may be
due to the differences in the level of efficiency of the three labour markets. The American
labour market is efficient and education allows workers to achieve higher wage rates,
while in the Russian and Italian labour markets return on education is low and the
opportunity cost of work is small even for educated workers. Moreover, in Russia peo-
ple with only primary education are still a significant part of the population, as shown in
Table 1.
Among household characteristics, household composition is, as expected, one of the
main determinants of both child care and domestic tasks. The number of young chil-
dren, aged 0–3 and 4–6, have a positive impact on fathers’ and mothers’ hours of
child care, with a larger impact for younger children. The number of children aged
0–3 has an impact on domestic tasks, increasing husbands’ and reducing wives’ hours
of domestic tasks. This is a plausible results: when children are small, husbands may
substitute for their wives in doing more domestic tasks. Grandparents in the household
clearly help with household production, reducing hours of domestic tasks for both males
and females, not reducing, however, parents’ child care. Finally, non-Russian parents
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dedicate less time to their children and non-Russian wives participate less to the labour
market.
The correlation coefficients of the error terms capture the correlation between unob-
servable factors - both unobserved individual preferences and omitted variables - that
influence the equations in the system (5 and 6).
In line with Bloemen et al (2010), Table 4 shows that almost all the estimated corre-
lation coefficients are statistically significant. This means that unobserved preferences
of husband and wife can be correlated, which is also a feature of the underlying the-
oretical model presented in Section “Theoretical foundations”. Focusing on child care
equations, unobservables of the equation for father’s child care are positively corre-
lated with mother’s child care, suggesting similar tastes, rather than complementar-
ity, with respect to child care. Positive correlation for child care and domestic tasks
between spouses seems to indicate a positive assortative mating, namely, individu-
als marry each other if they have similar (unobserved) preferences. The same is not
true for paid work, since we observe no significant correlations, except for a nega-
tive correlation between female child care and paid work, and female domestic tasks
and paid work. This is a sign that the explanatory variables were unable to capture all
the existing trade-offs between domestic activities and paid work for women. Finally,
labour participation is significantly correlated with hours of work for both partners
and with the wage equation for wives, confirming the presence of self-selection in the
sample.
Conclusions
The main contribution of this article consists of assessing the influence of alcohol con-
sumption on parental child care. To our knowledge, this is the first study to address the
problem of the effects of alcohol consumption on the allocation of time within the house-
hold. Building on Becker’s hypothesis of altruistic preferences, we assume that parents’
utility functions depend on their children’s welfare. In turn, the latter is determined by
a composite child good that is produced in the household through market goods and
child care time. This way, studying the determinants of time spent doing child care,
domestic tasks and paid work, permits one to deduce parental preferences towards child
welfare.
Empirically, we estimate a system of time supply equations (hours of child care, of
domestic tasks and of paid work) integrated with labour market participation and wage
equations. Our results show that alcohol consumption of the husband negatively affects
his time spent doing child care, but has no effects on his or his spouse’s labour supply
or wage. In our model, child welfare is determined by child’s consumption of a com-
posite good produced by the parents using child care time and market goods. We find
that fathers’ alcohol consumption significantly reduces child care time without affecting
family income, thus reducing child welfare through a reduction of the composite good
consumed by his children. We find no effects of mother’s alcohol consumption on any
time use category, labour participation or wages.
Overall, our findings confirm that alcohol consumption is mainly a male phenomenon,
and that it negatively affects other family members. In particular, it seems that fathers’
preferences for their children’s welfare are reduced by alcohol intake, with a welfare loss
for the more vulnerable components of the household. This, jointly with the increasing
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medical and psychological evidence on the damages of alcohol consumption, should be a
matter of thorough discussion at the institutional level.
Endnotes
1For a conceptual definition of child care in time use surveys, see Folbre and Yoon
(2007).
2See Garcia-Mainar et al (2011), and Giannelli et al (2012) for a recent cross-country
comparison of intra-household allocation of child care and domestic tasks time.
3The authors have explored all the possible causes of the dramatic swings in mortality
in the country and found that one of the most important factor is alcohol consumption,
especially as it relates to external causes of death such as homicide, suicide and
accidents.
4Note that the solution of the maximization problem would also provide Marshallian
demand functions for market goods, provided that goods expenditure and prices are
observed and that a household production technology is assumed. In that case, time use
function should also depend on market price of goods. In our empirical setting,
however, market good expenditures and prices are not available and p′x is treated as an
endogenously determined total household expenditure and prices are not included in
the time use equations.
5To avoid notation abuse we do not index observations.
6Among the inspected variables, as suggested by previous literature, we tested: average
regional alcohol price (in several specifications), average regional alcohol consumption,
percentage of alcoholics in the region, past disruptive events (job loss and year of loss),
suffering chronic illness (diabetes), and so on. None of these variables were significant in
determining alcohol consumption.
7Lillard, Lee A. and Constantijn W.A. Panis. 2003. aML Multilevel Multiprocess
Statistical Software, Version 2.0. EconWare, Los Angeles, California.
8RLMS-HSE site: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse.
9For instance, there may be reciprocity of child care between families. Furthermore, it
would not be possible to identify whether child care is provided to a subject’s own
children, or to those of other families within the household.
10The first four rounds of Phase II also record time use information, but the measures
are not directly comparable and a separate analysis of those years should be carried out,
which could be the subject of a future study.
11To our knowledge, at the time of writing the only panel study at the household level
using RMLS is Lacroix and Radtchenko (2011). Indeed, constructing the household
panel is possible only at the cost of dropping conflicting households and the households
appearing only once in the sample. Some exploratory investigations led to a drastic
reduction of the sample size. This implies that obtaining any meaningful result would
have been barely possible.
12To clarify, we keep all families in the last round (XVIII). If one of these families is
present in other waves we keep only the observation that corresponds to the last wave.
Then we add families of round XVII that are not present in XVIII and so on. This way, in
the pooled data-set each family appears just once, avoiding over-weighting repeated
families. This reduces by a substantial amount the sample size because the majority of
the households are present in more than one wave.
13Child care time is computed as the sum of two time use questions: 1) Played,
occupied, spent your leisure time with children or grandchildren who live with you, and
2) Looked after children or grandchildren who live with you- bathed them, fed them, led
them to lessons.
14Time devoted to domestic tasks is computed as the sum of 8 time use questions: 1)
Purchased food goods, 2) Prepared food, 3) Washed dishes, 4) Did laundry, 5) Cleaned
rooms 6) Did a small repair of house or dacha, or repaired a car, 7) Did repair work of
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house, dacha and 8) Drove a car with “family” purposes U˝ for trips to a store, to the
dacha.
15Clearly, these figures should not be generalized for the entire Russian population, as
they were computed on a restricted sub-sample.
16It is well known that identification based uniquely on non-linearity is possible but
likely to be problematic.
17The aML statistical software does not include facilities for computing
marginal/partial effects so we proceeded manually. In doing so we accounted for the
censored nature of both child care time and alcohol consumption, and for the
logarithmic specification of child care time.
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